Reports, updates and columns

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Research reports

April 29, 2026

Impact study on the effects of the green gas blending mandate on green gas production, Dutch CO2 reduction, economic prosperity, and consumer prices.

  • The targeted increase in green gas production is ambitious, and production will only rise enough to meet the mandate if the blending requirement is implemented efficiently;
  • If green gas production in the Netherlands does not gain sufficient momentum, CO2 reductions will take place abroad;
  • As a result of the import of green gas certificates, wealth is flowing to other countries;
  • The blending requirement leads to an increase in gas costs for consumers;
  • Additional policy measures are needed to ensure that green gas production reaches sufficient levels and that the business case for green gas producers is viable.

February 17, 2026

The Dutch chemical sector is facing a major transition. How can we ensure that the production of plastics and other carbon products is both circular and competitive by 2050? In its report Van Keten naar Kringloop (From Chain to Cycle), Invest-NL outlines the possible technological routes, the choices involved, and the policy requirements.

Carbon is needed for products such as plastics, building materials, and high-quality materials. Currently, that carbon mainly comes from oil and gas. If the Netherlands wants to be climate neutral by 2050, that fossil carbon must be gradually replaced by recycled streams, bio-based raw materials, and carbon from CO2.

On behalf of Invest-NL, EqoLibrium investigated which routes are most promising and what role Invest-NL can play in this. The scenario analysis helps to make targeted investment choices and to discuss the necessary preconditions with the government, industry, and other financiers.

https://www.invest-nl.nl/nl/nieuws/van-keten-naar-kringloop-zo-maken-we-koolstofchemie-circulair

December 24, 2025

In order to comply with the agreements in the climate agreement, significant steps must be taken in the Netherlands to reduce CO2 emissions. The use of fossil fuels will be replaced as much as possible by sustainable alternatives such as renewable energy from wind and solar power. The energy transition requires a fundamentally different energy system than the current one, which is insufficiently prepared for the growing demand for energy.

The Province of Zeeland is working with network operators and municipalities to draw up the Provincial Multi-Year Infrastructure, Energy, and Climate Program (PMIEK). The PMIEK 2.0 includes various research and exploratory projects. One of the research projects concerns the municipality of Sluis. Sluis has a unique profile because the tourism sector has a major impact on energy consumption. In addition to regular demand from households and businesses, tourism causes sharp peaks in consumption, particularly in the summer and during holiday periods.

At the same time, the landscape around Sluis is a major tourist attraction, which causes exceptionally high peaks in energy demand and consumption at certain times of the year. This combination—a large and expansive rural area, a limited population density, and strong seasonal peaks—means that both demand patterns and spatial conditions play an important role in the design and construction of the future energy system.

This study provides insight into how the energy system in the municipality of Sluis can be organized in the future. Based on model calculations, various scenarios for the development of the energy system are compared. The scenarios show how choices regarding sustainable generation, heat pumps, and grid integration affect costs, emissions, and grid load.

Lessons from the study

Based on the model calculations, this study provided the grid operator, the province of Zeeland, and the municipality of Sluis with insight into the bottlenecks in terms of potential grid congestion in a municipality that wants to continue to grow and has specific characteristics in terms of energy demand and supply and location.

The anticipated problems surrounding the timing of the expansion of the Oostburg station contributed to Stedin's decision to bring forward the expansion of this station by several years. The study also showed that there are various no-regret options for making the energy mix more sustainable in order to:

a) reduceCO2 emissions in order to achieve the climate targets set, and

b) that are most favorable in terms of cost.

It is often said that "to measure is to know." This study shows that this is true. By understanding the transition and calculating the possible scenarios on the table, network operators and policymakers can make the choices that are most beneficial. Beneficial for residents and for businesses.

Another aspect is that this study has really brought parties together. Various parties, such as the network operator, the province, the municipality, and local entrepreneurs, were of course already in frequent contact with each other. Nevertheless, a study such as this helps to provide insight into and reflect on topics that have a common denominator and that everyone considers important. It usually turns out that if you are aware of each other's interests and concerns and are open about them, various goals can be achieved and it becomes clear who should do what and when.

July 2, 2025

The energy transition in the Netherlands is causing a sharp increase in both the demand for and supply of electricity. As a result, grid congestion is a growing problem: it occurs when the transmission capacity of the electricity grid at a given location is insufficient to meet the demand for, or supply of, electricity. This leads to bottlenecks in business parks, among other places. Companies want to expand their operations in vain, sustainable projects are delayed and other companies want to establish themselves in a new location.

Grid expansion is the most effective solution to this problem, but grid expansions take years to realize. Current policies to address grid congestion have only marginal effect for now. At the same time, significant social costs arise from grid congestion because sustainability or business expansion cannot take place. Therefore, other solutions are necessary to counteract the negative effects of grid congestion.

Generation of local renewable energy can provide relief
One possible solution to this is more local generation of renewable energy. Indeed, local energy generation on business parks, often in combination with battery storage or other methods that provide flexibility, can help alleviate grid congestion. In addition, this often requires reducing the peak demand of the business park. This either creates more relative grid space for own use, or can reduce the total required grid capacity in favor of other users. Business parks are ideally suited for this purpose because of their economies of scale and the coherence of different types of businesses, and thus different types of energy demand.

This report therefore examines the extent to which local generation of electricity from solar and wind on business parks offers a solution to congestion problems. To illustrate this, the impact of local generation for two types of business parks is analyzed through a model calculation. For both business parks, two scenarios of renewable generation (one with and one without wind energy) are compared to the business as usual scenario. The scenario in which a combination of solar and wind is possible is referred to as Optimum. Finally, the scenario without wind is referred to as No Wind. The distinction between the two types of business parks allows for a broader interpretation of results. The different business parks concern hypothetical situations, based on real data. This makes these business parks exemplary of many cases around the country.

May 8, 2025

TenneT's security of supply report (May 2024) warns of potential problems with the security of electricity supply in the Netherlands in 2033. This is due to a combination of growing electricity demand and a larger share of solar and wind power in the electricity mix. The decline of controllable generation capacity, such as gas-fired power plants, and the limited supply of other forms of flexibility contribute to this threat. This problem is also visible in other Northwest European countries, which increases the urgency to address this issue.

In the current situation, coal and gas plants are the main controllable power. However, with the ban on coal power starting in 2030, by 2033 the Netherlands will rely on renewable energy, imports from surrounding countries, gas power plants and battery storage to meet demand. About 9 GW of gas power plants are expected to be operational in 2033, down from the current 12.5 GW. There is a risk that the number of available gas power plants will decline more or less simultaneously, which could seriously threaten security of supply.

The TEACOS model used in the report calculated that the Netherlands will need 23 GW of controllable power in 2033, or 37.6 TWh on an annual basis (for 3,798 hours). This means that the Netherlands will depend on imports, gas plants or industrial demand-side management 40% of the time. Interconnection capacity for imports is an important resource at 13.8 GW, but the availability of imports at times of scarcity is not guaranteed due to competition from other countries and geopolitical risks.

Battery capacity is seen as a complementary solution, but can only contribute for short periods and is limited by technical and market uncertainties. The remaining need for controllable power must be met by gas power plants, as the other options do not provide sufficient capacity.

The cost of shutting down or shifting in time industrial production, especially when it becomes mandatory, can be high and negatively impact businesses and households. Capacity mechanisms have been introduced in surrounding countries, where availability is rewarded. This option could also help in the Netherlands to ensure security of supply at lower social costs.

The report recommends the creation of an "insurance premium" for keeping regulable generation capacity available, especially in the form of gas plants, through, for example, a capacity mechanism. This should help prevent the Netherlands from becoming dependent on unreliable imports and the expensive demand-side management option. It is also suggested that security of supply be looked at more broadly, taking into account not only the costs of demand-side management but also the impact on value chains, investments and the affordability of energy for households and businesses.

Theme reports

July 20, 2026

The evolution of the EU ETS can be seen as an ongoing quest to strike a balance between market forces and political guidance. While the system was originally designed primarily as a market mechanism in which an increasingly scarce emissions cap was intended to stimulate investments in emissions reductions through price formation, the ETS is increasingly being used to support broader economic and industrial policy objectives as well. The recent revision thus represents not only the next step in the system’s development but also marks a further shift in the role of the EU ETS.

This analysis first describes the development of the EU ETS and the key proposed changes that have been implemented in anticipation of Phase 5. It then examines three broader insights from the review: the political significance of ETS revenues, the evolution of the ETS toward a hybrid policy instrument, and the growing uncertainty regarding the future role of the ETS price as an investment signal.

Feb. 27, 2025

On Wednesday, Feb. 26, the European Commission released its long-awaited Clean Industrial Deal (CID). This policy package responds to the EU's challenges of geopolitical tensions, slow economic growth, and technological competition. Within the CID, policies around affordable energy are identified as a cornerstone. This is shaped in the Action Plan for Affordable Energy (AEA). Specifically, these packages aim to restore European industrial competitiveness. 

The CID presents an impressive number of measures that appear substantial on paper, but the real challenge lies in the nuances of implementation. While some packages will be implemented as early as 2025, in reality many measures are merely announcements of initiatives that will not take full effect until 2026 or later. This delay contrasts sharply with the speed at which U.S. subsidies through the Inflation Reduction Act and Chinese support measures are being rolled out.

The fundamental challenge lies in the asymmetric structure of the EU itself: while Brussels provides strategic vision and policy frameworks, financial implementation falls largely to the member states. Although EU cohesion mechanisms somewhat level out existing differences, the core problem remains that many member states are already struggling with tight national budgets. As a result, new EU policy ambitions for which member states must largely pay themselves come up against an unruly financial reality - a problem exacerbated in the current political climate where nationalist sentiment often prevails over European solidarity.

All in all, the CID is a step in the right direction. It is the impetus from the European Commission that must now be kicked in by the national member states. Speed and decisive action in a global context where Europe has to compete with superpowers such as the U.S. and China, remains a major challenge. As long as Europe is unable to improve this, plans such as the CID and the AEA will turn out to be fine ambitions, but will not be able to turn the tide for industrial competitiveness in time.

In order to cash in on the European push, member states must do more than just cherry-pick the financial cherry from the EU-supplied "directives porridge. Restoring European, and therefore national, industrial competitiveness costs money. The alternative, however, is that it will cost us even more money when the same industry leaves for good. The water is already at their lips. Let us now invest quickly and decisively to preserve our industry.

November 27, 2024

The EU introduced the first-ever greenhouse gas emissions trading system in 2005: the European Union Emission Trading System or EU ETS for short. Accounting for nearly 50% of the EU's total greenhouse gas emissions, it is often referred to as the cornerstone of European climate policy. The EU ETS covers the power sector, heavy industry and continental flights. Heavy industry in turn consists, for example, of companies in the chemical, metal and stone industries.

The EU ETS has now been in operation for almost two decades. In these twenty years, the system has endured a number of profound economic, political and social changes. For example, we faced a global economic crisis in 2008, the Paris Agreement was signed in 2015, after which global climate policy really gained momentum, and we faced a pandemic in 2020. In all that time, the core of the EU ETS remained intact: Emissions are priced and GHG emissions from ETS sectors fall to zero.

An (international) emissions trading system with a decreasing number of emission allowances is one of the most cost-effective ways to reduce emissions. A predetermined decreasing emissions cap provides companies with certainty that emissions across the sector must go to zero. At the same time, participating parties can trade allowances among themselves, creating a price for allowances. That price ensures that emissions are reduced where it is cheapest to do so. Moreover, emission rights are becoming increasingly scarce. This creates upward price pressure from the supply side of the market. Following the example of the EU, other countries and regions in various parts of the world have now set up emissions trading systems for reducing greenhouse gases.

Currently, the policy framework is such that no more allowances will be issued from 2040. So the system has been operating for about 20 years, and under current plans it will serve for at least another 15 years. The system's emissions cap never dropped as much as it is now. Voices are also already emerging in the current debate for a lifetime extension of the emissions trading system beyond 2039. This could eventually create a market for negative emissions.

Over 20 years, the EU ETS has made an indispensable contribution to the energy transition. The system has ensured that the cheapest emission reduction options have taken place. This inherently also means that the necessary more expensive choices for emission reduction have yet to take place. The emissions price is guiding this. A second, stand-alone emissions trading system will come into effect from 2027: ETS-2. This ETS will oversee emissions reductions from the transport sector, the built environment and smaller industry.

This thematic report provides an overview of the historical policy and price developments of the EU ETS. In addition, it provides interpretation on sustainability within the EU ETS and what possible implications there may be for the market. Finally, it provides insight into developments regarding ETS2.

April 4, 2024

The European Union (EU) has several policies in place to address issues such as meeting climate goals. One of these measures is the pricing of CO2 emissions through the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). This system was established in 2005 to encourage companies to become more sustainable through pricing. It is a measure that has been welcomed by industry and so far appears to be working well.

Because CO2 prices are not universally applied, companies that do fall under such a scheme experience a competitive disadvantage. Therefore, many of the sectors covered by the EU ETS currently still receive free allowances to remain competitive with comparable producers in many non-European countries. Some sectors simply take longer to become sustainable than others. Yet the European Commission (EC) wants to get rid of these free allowances, and with the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), has come up with a measure to maintain the level playing field and counter leakage risks.

The CBAM imposes a levy on the cost price of goods, thereby also pricing in emissions released from production outside the EU. This includes several product groups, namely iron and steel, fertilizers, cement, aluminum, electricity and hydrogen. CBAM has been introduced in three phases to replace these free allowances, while phasing them out. As the share of free allowances decreases, the cost of CO2 emissions increases. The CBAM scheme applies to importers of CBAM goods produced outside the EU. As a result, products not produced in the EU are priced for emissions just as much as European goods consumed within the EU.

Where at its base CBAM is a good idea to implement a tariff on goods produced outside the EU, thereby protecting European industry and at the same time extending the positive impact of European climate policy to global climate policy, there are also areas for improvement. For example, CBAM focuses only on imports of commodities covered by the levy into the EU and does not consider exports. It also does not take into account the fact that the cost price calculation for a product produced outside the EU is different from one produced within the EU. Furthermore, it charges a levy on raw materials, but not on products imported that already incorporate these raw materials. We describe these and some other shortcomings in this report.

Finally, we come up with some recommendations that would improve the functioning of the CBAM and keep the actual goal - a level global playing field for European producers as well as encouraging sustainability through pricing - intact.

March 6, 2024

The Netherlands has long been considered a good location for energy-intensive industries. Dutch greenhouse horticulture is very extensive, several industrial clusters have been established, and the port of Rotterdam has a strong attraction for chemicals and refineries, among others. This industrial capacity - with its high labour productivity - is of considerable importance for the Dutch economy in a broad sense. Not only because of its large indirect employment, but also because it forms the basis for the manufacturing industry, which makes products such as windmills and fertilisers. These products make an important contribution to the strategic autonomy of the Netherlands and Europe, making basic industry important for, among other things, the success of the energy transition and stability in the food supply.

Recently, we have seen a series of developments that negatively affect the favorable business climate of the Netherlands, particularly for energy-intensive industries. Dutch companies, as in the rest of Europe, face high gas and electricity prices as a result of the sanctions introduced after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This is often as much as two to three times what American companies pay. Whereas in our surrounding countries the government is trying to accommodate these sectors with tax breaks, the Dutch government has actually decided to make gas and electricity more expensive for large consumers with some measures. In recent years, the Dutch government has also shown with varying policies that it does not have a consistent long-term vision of where it wants to go with the industry. Some measures are at odds with others. As a result, the energy-intensive industry does not really know where it stands. This leads headquarters abroad to postpone investment decisions or move to locations outside the Netherlands.

While the Netherlands is becoming less and less attractive for industrial production relative to its neighbors, the same is true for Europe as a whole. In addition to affordability, the security of supply and/or delivery of energy for European companies is surrounded by increasing risks. Europe is almost entirely dependent on imports for almost all fuels. In addition, other industrial powers have extensive government stimulus programs, such as the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) in the United States (US) and similar programs in China. The European Union (EU) is a lot less generous with such state support and instead comes up with mostly obligations for companies (such as CSDD and CSRD), which require more administration and controls and thus increase costs. This fits into a broader picture in Europe, where (fossil) energy-intensive companies are slowly but surely losing their social license-to-operate. The focus here is strongly on climate policy, with politicians giving affordability, availability, and strategic independence a lower priority than in other parts of the world.

In this report, we look at recent developments and describe the reasons for the changing investment climate. This overview is needed to arrive at the right strategic choices for the benefit of the Dutch investment climate. Not having a long-term vision is also a choice, but one with potentially major consequences.

Market updates

October 12, 2026

  • Electricity Prices: High gas prices remain the main driver of prices, while low hydropower reserves, nuclear outages in France, and additional exports from efficient Dutch gas-fired power plants via the Northwest European interconnector are further intensifying upward price pressure.
  • Gas Prices: Relatively low European gas stocks and geopolitical uncertainty are keeping the market on edge, while the ENTSOG scenario analysis shows that, in an extreme winter scenario, a demand reduction of up to 50 bcm is needed to keep the gas market in balance.
  • EU ETS: The ETS price is being supported by higher coal consumption and increasing compliance requirements, while political negotiations could continue well into 2027.

September 29, 2026

  • Oil prices under geopolitical pressure: The Brent price is reacting primarily to rumors surrounding negotiations between the U.S. and Iran and is trading at around USD 103 per barrel.
  • Export Restrictions on Diesel: Potential U.S. export restrictions on diesel are weighing on the WTI price due to lower domestic U.S. refining demand and, consequently, lower oil demand.
  • High gas prices: The active monthly TTF contract is trading at around EUR 70/MWh after peaking at over EUR 82/MWh in mid-September.
  • Gas reserves are lagging behind: The European storage fill rate is about 71%, compared with over 82% last year and a five-year average of 87%.
  • Uncertainty regarding stockpiling targets: The European natural gas stockpiling targets are in effect through December 31, 2027, and may be extended, modified, or terminated.
  • Rising natural gas transmission rates: According to the ACM, transmission rates could rise sharply in the coming decades due to declining natural gas consumption.

September 15, 2026

  • Electricity prices are rising: The active Dutch monthly contract for baseload electricity rose from approximately EUR 130/MWh to about EUR 175/MWh in one month. The increase in the TTF gas price, from approximately EUR 60/MWh to EUR 82/MWh, was a major factor in this rise.
  • Lower renewable generation increases pressure: The rollover of monthly contracts and seasonal variations are exacerbating the price increase. The share of solar power will decline in the coming months, while the growth in wind power cannot yet fully offset the price pressure. Higher coal prices are also a factor: the Rotterdam coal benchmark rose from approximately USD 125/metric ton to over USD 135/metric ton.
  • The EU ETS remains fundamentally strong: The December contract for the EU ETS is trading at over EUR 85 per metric ton, about 5% higher than a month earlier. High natural gas prices are making coal-fired power generation relatively more profitable, leading to an increase in coal production and demand for emission allowances. At the same time, a slowdown in industrial production could weaken industrial demand for allowances.
  • ETS Reform Carries Additional Price Risks: Negotiations on the ETS reform could create both upward and downward pressure. For now, the European Parliament appears to be more ambitious than the European Commission, in part by supporting the retention of the cancellation mechanism within the Market Stability Reserve.
  • The national CO2 tax is still in effect: Although the minority coalition wants to abolish the national CO2 tax, no legislative amendment to that effect has yet been passed. The previous link to approximately EUR 1.2 billion in European recovery funds now appears to be less of an obstacle, but the tax remains legally in effect until both chambers approve its abolition. For 2027, only an average ETS price below EUR 78.67 per metric ton in September and October would trigger a payment obligation; that scenario does not currently appear to be the most likely.

September 2, 2026

  • Tight natural gas market: More than six months of disruptions to Qatari LNG supplies have led to a significant decline in LNG supply. Even if the Strait of Hormuz reopens, the outlook for the winter remains tight.
  • Price Over Supply Security: Europe will likely be able to avoid a physical gas shortage, but to do so, it must compete in a tight global LNG market. The greatest risk, therefore, lies with the price.
  • Weather Again a Key Factor in Winter Prices: Low inventories increase vulnerability to cold spells, disappointing wind power generation, and unexpected disruptions in gas supply.
  • Demand curbs offer only temporary relief: Increased use of coal-fired power plants and potential drops in demand may temper gas demand, but they do not change the fundamentally tight market conditions.
  • OPEC is losing control over supply: Increased production outside OPEC could put downward pressure on oil prices in the long run, but at the same time increases the risk of underinvestment and greater price volatility.

August 19, 2026

  • High electricity prices: High electricity prices are being sustained by ongoing tightness in the gas market and production constraints resulting from drought in Northwestern Europe.
  • EU ETS Price Support: Energy prices indicate continued support for the ETS market as long as coal-fired power plants remain more profitable than gas-fired power plants.
  • Historical price dynamics: Past market cycles show that upward price pressure in the ETS market can quickly reverse when gas prices normalize.
  • Electrification Action Plan: EU directives support further electrification, but the plans are still too vague to have an impact on the market.

Columns

August 26, 2026

The energy transition is caught in a paradox: the desire to phase out fossil fuels more quickly is growing, while resistance to the alternatives is actually increasing. This is creating a widening gap between ambitions and practical feasibility. According to Hans van Cleef, the transition can only succeed if supply, demand, and infrastructure grow simultaneously. This requires more space for energy facilities, decisive government policy, and an honest debate about the inevitable consequences: the transition is becoming more visible, more complex, and more expensive for everyone.

Hans van Cleef is Head of Energy Research at EqoLibrium (this column was written in a personal capacity and previously appeared in Studio Energie Opinie)

 

Last week, Energeia reported that replacing old wind turbines with new ones—known as “repowering”—is not going as planned. We’re hearing more and more often that the further expansion of renewable energy is slowing down. Not only the elimination of the net metering program for solar panels and grid congestion, but also growing resistance to replacing—let alone building new—onshore wind turbines is causing delays. In addition, solar and wind farm projects are becoming increasingly expensive, and investors are more cautious, putting pressure on the business case.

At the same time—especially after this summer’s heat waves—civil society organizations and policymakers are calling for a faster phase-out of fossil fuels. This creates tension. A faster phase-out of fossil fuels must go hand in hand with a faster rollout of alternatives.

“We want the benefits of the digital economy, but not the physical infrastructure required to support it.”

Since efforts to make industry more sustainable or to electrify it are making very limited progress, the growth in demand for electricity must come from somewhere else. That is precisely why it is striking that public opposition to data centers continues to grow. These data centers are primarily viewed as energy wasters and create few jobs.

It is a bit hypocritical, though, since virtually everyone uses digital services on a daily basis. And with the advent of artificial intelligence, the demand for data processing will continue to grow in the coming years. This is a curious contradiction. We want the benefits of the digital economy, but not the physical infrastructure that is necessary to support it.

“What seemed like a theoretical problem for years has turned into a tangible economic drag”

And even if supply and demand do become better balanced, that electricity still needs to be transmitted. Reports of grid congestion and a lack of capacity on the grid appear in the newspapers every day. Consequently, there is a great deal of frustration about the grid acting as a limiting factor when it comes to building more homes, expanding business operations, connecting charging stations for electric cars, and so on.

For years, there were clear signs that the power grid would be unable to handle the growing demand and generation. Yet not enough was done to prepare for this. Now, in many places, businesses and consumers are literally waiting for a connection or an expansion of capacity. What seemed like a theoretical problem for years has turned into a tangible economic obstacle.

But if a grid operator then tries to obtain a permit for a transformer station in the neighborhood or a number of high-voltage transmission towers, the number of appeals is countless, and this expansion is significantly delayed—if it succeeds at all.

“The risk is that we keep following the same pattern over and over again. That’s not a strategy—it’s procrastination.”

It is thus becoming increasingly clear that all the low-hanging fruit has already been picked, and that the energy transition is starting to become more and more tangible and visible. Tangible in the decline in security of supply, tangible in our wallets, visible in the landscape, and visible in the fact that we can no longer blindly carry out our (energy-intensive) plans. It’s causing friction once again.

“No pain, no gain” is, as the saying goes, a well-known adage. But in a world that is already increasingly dominated by contradictions, geopolitical unrest, and—at the very least—a sense of growing inequality, finding common ground on these issues is becoming an increasingly difficult task.

The risk is that we constantly follow the same pattern: first, we spend years recognizing that a problem is emerging; then, we engage in endless discussions about possible solutions; and finally, we take action only when the consequences have fully manifested themselves. That is not a strategy—it is procrastination.

“The energy transition will not succeed simply by increasing supply. It will only succeed when supply, demand, and infrastructure grow together.”

If the Netherlands truly wants to make progress in phasing out fossil fuels, we must accept that a sustainable future requires more electricity, not less. That means making room for electrification, data centers, AI, and more energy infrastructure. At the same time, it requires a government that is willing to look ahead and bridge temporary market shortages when societal goals demand it.

The energy transition will not succeed simply by increasing supply. It will only succeed when supply, demand, and infrastructure grow in tandem. Furthermore, it is certain that our energy supply will become more expensive. Everyone must be brought on board in this regard as well. Simply stating that “polluting companies” should pay is downright short-sighted. After all, the burden cannot be placed indefinitely on the business community due to international competition. Moreover, those costs will, wherever possible, be passed on to the end user (i.e., the voter).

In short, the transition is becoming more difficult, more visible, and more expensive for everyone. That insight seems obvious, but it is strikingly often overlooked in the current debate. Perhaps it is time to correct that and paint an honest—and above all, complete—picture. Before this problem, too, gets out of hand and we only then decide to do something about it.

July 29, 2026

Ambition is the foundation of progress, but policy only becomes effective when it is also feasible and predictable. Yet we regularly see ambitious policy measures being adjusted, postponed, or watered down later on, once reality proves more challenging than expected. This raises the question of whether governments should more often assess feasibility in advance, rather than having to make adjustments afterward.

Hans van Cleef is Head of Energy Research at EqoLibrium (this column was written in a personal capacity)

 

When I used to do something my parents didn't approve of, I'd get punished. Depending on how serious the offense was, I wouldn't be allowed to play outside or my allowance would be cut. The same logic worked the other way around, too: good behavior or extra effort was rewarded. As a result, I earned my swimming certificate in no time, and riding a bike without training wheels soon came naturally.

However, parenting is mainly about being consistent. If one parent says no and the other then gives in anyway, the first parent’s authority erodes. Inconsistency undermines credibility.

The same applies to governments. They influence behavior through taxes, fees, and subsidies. These are tried-and-true tools for achieving policy goals. But here, too, the following applies: if you constantly adjust rules, postpone measures, or fail to enforce announced sanctions, it undermines the reliability of the policy and the government’s credibility.

“Postponing the methane law doesn’t mean it’s off the table”

Last week, I read about the postponement of fines for oil and gas companies that violate European methane regulations. Starting in 2027, these regulations are intended to encourage producers to reduce their methane emissions. In theory, that sounds logical: the polluter pays. But while it sounds like a noble and logical plan in theory, it may turn out differently in practice.

In practice, however, the situation is more complicated. Producers who cannot meet the requirements risk losing access to the European market. As a result, the EU must purchase oil and gas from elsewhere. In a market already under pressure from geopolitical tensions and the loss of Russian gas, that is not an obvious alternative.

In addition, many suppliers are concerned about the significant administrative burden that the regulations entail. The International Energy Agency (IEA) recently warned that the methane regulations could lead to a decline in European energy imports. While the IEA has been issuing very strong warnings about a great many things lately, I believe they are right on this one. It seems these concerns have now also reached Brussels.

That is why it has been decided to temporarily postpone enforcement. No fines will be imposed over the next three years. But postponement does not mean cancellation. The law remains in effect, and with it, the uncertainty for the market. I doubt that this temporary pause will be enough to eliminate the undesirable side effects. A next step could be to fundamentally reconsider the measure, as was done previously with the national CO₂ tax.

“The consequences of policy are often predictable”

The pattern is familiar. Ambitious goals lead to ambitious policies. Then it turns out that reality is more challenging than expected, and the plans are adjusted.

That should come as no surprise. You can encourage electrification, but without sufficient grid capacity, that ambition will come to a standstill. You can aim to reduce industrial emissions, but if that makes companies unable to compete internationally, investments and jobs will disappear. You can promote recycling, but if tax rules have the opposite effect, the policy will miss its mark.

Of course, policies must be able to be adjusted when new insights call for it. That’s a healthy approach. But many of the problems that later lead to course corrections are often already apparent in advance.

In studies we conduct at EqoLibrium, we regularly find that policy proposals seem logical on paper but turn out differently in practice. After all, companies operate in an international market and are constrained by what is technologically and economically feasible. That reality can usually be analyzed quite well in advance.

“Ambition is good, but realism is better”

My former employer, ABN AMRO, once used the slogan: “It starts with ambition.” I thought that was a powerful slogan back then, and I still do. Ambition drives you to look beyond the status quo and strive for higher goals.

But ambition alone is not enough. If the bar is consistently set higher than what is achievable, there will inevitably be a need to water down, postpone, or reverse policies later on. That is understandable, but it comes at a cost.

Because every time announced measures aren’t followed through on, confidence in government policy declines. And just as with parenting, the same applies to governments: you build credibility by being consistent—not by constantly changing the rules.

 

July 1, 2026

Prices at the pump skyrocket as soon as a conflict flares up in the Middle East. But behind those rising oil and gas prices, a much larger shift is taking place. While the world watches the geopolitical tensions surrounding Iran, the economic balance of power is also changing. The dominance of the U.S. petrodollar is slowly crumbling, while China is gaining ground more and more emphatically with the yuan. According to Hans van Cleef, this marks the birth of the “electroyuan.”

Ever since the U.S. and Israel resumed their attacks on Iran and the Strait of Hormuz was closed, oil and gas prices have once again taken center stage. Qatar’s gas exports also came to a temporary halt. The economic consequences are being felt worldwide. But behind this energy crisis, another development is unfolding: the changing role of the United States in the global economy.

Anyone who buys a barrel of Brent crude still pays in U.S. dollars. The same is true for a large portion of international trade. The dollar has been the linchpin of the global financial system for decades. The foundation for this was laid with the Bretton Woods system in 1944. Even after the gold standard was abandoned in 1971, the dollar remained the dominant global currency.

This was mainly due to the rise of the petrodollar. In the 1970s, oil-producing countries agreed with the U.S. to trade their oil exclusively in dollars, in exchange for, among other things, military protection. Because the whole world needed oil, demand for dollars remained enormous. Moreover, oil revenues were often reinvested in U.S. Treasury bonds.

“The combination of high government debt, rising inflation, trade wars, and political pressure on the U.S. central bank is eroding confidence in the dollar”

As a result, the United States benefited for many years from low financing costs, a strong credit rating, and the dollar’s virtually unassailable position. Even today, approximately 58% of global foreign exchange reserves are held in dollars, and the currency is involved in about 88% of all foreign exchange transactions.

However, that long-standing position is coming under increasing pressure. The combination of high government debt, rising inflation, trade wars, and political pressure on the U.S. Federal Reserve is eroding confidence in the dollar. The currency is also increasingly being used as a geopolitical tool, for example through sanctions and trade tariffs. This is driving other countries to reduce their dependence on the U.S. financial system.

China has made the most progress in this area. The other BRICS countries are also looking for alternative payment systems to reduce their dependence on the dollar. At the same time, the global energy system is also shifting. While the petrodollar rose to prominence thanks to oil, China is growing alongside the energy transition.

“China plays a key role in virtually every aspect of the energy transition. As a result, the use of the Chinese yuan is also on the rise.”

China now dominates the extraction and processing of critical raw materials and produces a large share of the world’s solar panels, batteries, wind turbines, and electric cars. China plays a key role in virtually every stage of the energy transition. As a result, the use of the Chinese yuan is also on the rise. More than a third of China’s trade in goods is now settled in its own currency.

Whereas oil has driven demand for dollars for years, the energy transition could eventually have the same effect on the yuan. For the time being, the yuan will not replace the dollar as the dominant global currency. Confidence in the U.S. financial markets is still too strong for that to happen. But the world is indeed moving toward a system with multiple economic power blocs. The “electroyuan” is therefore not a new global currency, but it is a sign that the balance of power is shifting.

This also has implications for the stability of the financial system. Much of international trade, lending, and foreign exchange reserves are still based on the dollar. When confidence in the dollar wanes, the risks of financial shocks also increase. Normally, such a shift in power would take place over decades. However, Trump’s economic and geopolitical policies appear to be significantly accelerating that process.

“What about the euro? Europe remains economically important, but political divisions and slow decision-making limit its geopolitical influence.”

A stronger yuan could offer a partial alternative in this regard. Just as the United States has benefited for decades from the dollar’s international role, China will increasingly benefit from the growing importance of its own currency. At the same time, this also makes the country more vulnerable to the same financial risks that currently affect the U.S. in particular.

What about the euro? Europe remains economically important, but political divisions and slow decision-making limit its geopolitical influence. The euro will therefore likely remain primarily a supplementary reserve currency, alongside the Japanese yen, the Swiss franc, and possibly even Bitcoin.

Meanwhile, dependence on China continues to grow—not only in the production of clean technology, but also in the financial settlement of those transactions. That is why I foresee one major shift in the coming decades: from the petrodollar to the electroyuan.

 

Hans van Cleef is Head of Energy Research at EqoLibrium (this column was written in a personal capacity and was previously published on Studio Energie Opinie)

June 2, 2026

During a vacation on the French Côte d’Azur, the contrast with the Netherlands is immediately apparent: while we struggle with grid congestion and rising energy costs, France seems far more carefree thanks to decades of investment in nuclear energy. The key lesson: the energy transition requires not only plans and ambition, but above all courage, investment, and political perseverance.

Over the past two weeks—after a hectic spring on the energy markets—I took some time off with a vacation on the Côte d’Azur. There, French life flows along peacefully, and the sun, wine, and outdoor cafés make life good. The local jet set doesn’t seem to worry about the cost of gasoline or diesel; massive motor yachts come and go in the picturesque little harbors.

The average French person doesn’t seem to worry about electricity usage either. During the first few days, the air conditioner could be set to the heating mode in the evenings during the last cool spring nights of the year. But summer soon arrived in full force, and temperatures soared. The air conditioners switched to cooling mode and hummed away at full speed. Grid congestion, excessive costs, and a government urging people to use as little electricity as possible between 4:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. are not an issue.

In the Netherlands, waiting lists for new connections or upgrades have grown to unprecedented lengths. In France, on the other hand, businesses are being attracted by the promise of stable and largely low-carbon electricity. This is due in no small part to its 57 nuclear reactors, which account for nearly 70% of the country’s electricity. Add some solar and wind energy to that, and for many countries, it serves as a model of what a mix of local and sustainable energy can—and perhaps must—look like.

“Over-reliance on energy imports makes a country vulnerable”

Of course, everyone knows that an energy transition isn’t the same as a transformation, and that it takes a lot of time (and money) to successfully transition to a good (read: reliable) new energy system. After all, the French didn’t rush into it either.

Although the first nuclear power plant in Marcoule began operations in 1956, France did not truly become a major power in this field until the 1980s. Following the 1973 oil crisis, the French government decided to focus on greater energy independence. After all, the oil crisis demonstrated that excessive dependence on imports makes a country vulnerable. This is a topic that is particularly relevant again today, proving once more that history always repeats itself.

If history repeats itself so often, you’d expect people to learn from it. After all, a donkey doesn’t stumble over the same stone twice. And although public opinion on nuclear energy in Europe shifted after the Fukushima disaster (2011)—think of Germany’s nuclear phase-out—France had other concerns. The old reactors were showing signs of wear and tear and therefore required more maintenance. On top of that, the problem of drought or excessively warm cooling water is becoming increasingly common. Yet this has not deterred President Macron from once again making a strong commitment to nuclear energy. His plans focus on new reactors (EPR2) and the construction of small modular reactors (SMRs).

“Transitions take time and money. And it takes political courage to acknowledge that and sell it to your supporters.”

It is one of many examples that show that vision, courage, and dedication can take you a long way. The French learned lessons from the oil crisis and resolved in 1973 that they didn’t want to go through that again. That’s why they fully committed to investments that paid off in the decades that followed, right up to the present day. It’s somewhat comparable to the Dutch storm surge barrier, which was also built after lessons were learned from the past and from which we still benefit today.

The lessons from recent events are plain to see. The COVID-19 crisis demonstrated that it is unwise to rely too heavily on imports of critical goods (such as face masks). The energy crisis (2021–present) shows that over-reliance on energy imports from a single country is problematic when a conflict arises with that country.

Although we have rapidly reduced our dependence on oil and gas imports from Russia, this has now been replaced by an excessive dependence on the United States—a country that brandishes trade tariffs and threatens to link those tariffs to the security of LNG supplies to Europe if no agreement is reached. China, too, regularly threatens to halt or reduce the supply or processing of critical metals.

Once again, there is talk in Europe of greater energy independence. The vision is there. However, the courage and commitment are lagging far behind. Transitions take time and money. And it takes political courage to acknowledge that and sell it to your constituents. Costs come before benefits. Right now, we’re still too focused on quick fixes and temporary measures, when what’s really needed is to scale up major long-term investments.

“You can’t bring about the energy transition from your bed”

The 113th Tour de France kicks off on Saturday, July 4. This year’s route features no fewer than two finishes on Alpe d’Huez, the mountain we like to call “the Dutch mountain.” This reminds me of a famous quote by Dutch Tour hero Joop Zoetemelk. In 1980, he said that you win the Tour in bed. What Zoetemelk meant by that was that only by resting well and taking time to recover can you endure such a grueling race and thus have a chance at victory.

You can’t bring about the energy transition from the comfort of your bed. But just like in the Tour de France, you need a plan, a team to carry it out, and time to take a breather now and then so you can finish the entire race. We have plenty of plans in Europe (and the Netherlands). Now we just need the courage and commitment to make them a reality. That requires determination, a lot of money, and courage.

Determined to give it our all for years to come. Funds to cover unprofitable peaks and enable the business community to physically bring about the transition. And the courage to keep explaining this to the public—and thus the voters—even in the face of headwinds or setbacks. In short, not with a slapdash approach, but with a French level of commitment!

 

Hans van Cleef is Head of Energy Research at EqoLibrium (this column was written in a personal capacity)

May 5, 2026

Extreme price fluctuations in the electricity market seem to have become the new normal. From sharply negative prices during periods of oversupply to spikes during shortages: the system is buckling under its own dynamics. Yet the solution does not lie in more market intervention or in splitting the market into one for renewable electricity and one for natural gas. The solution lies primarily in smart choices, because the government already holds the key levers for controlling costs.

It happened again at the end of last month. Electricity prices dropped to a record low of minus 550 euros across virtually all of Northwestern Europe. A combination of wind, plenty of sunshine, and lower demand meant that all the electricity needed could be generated from renewable energy sources for several hours straight.

In fact, there was so much of it that it led to a significant oversupply of electricity. After all, negative prices are always the result of an imbalance between supply and demand. Too much supply leads to the need for load shedding to keep the grid in balance. And that is why the grid operator has to dig deep into its pockets to entice parties to use more and, if that does not fully succeed, to shed load.

It’s the new normal. Not just negative prices, but above all an increasingly frequent imbalance between supply and demand. Price fluctuations in the electricity market are now many times more volatile than, for example, in the oil and gas market. After all, the electricity market must always—that is, every second—remain stable at 50 Hertz. That requires a great deal of balancing. For commodity markets such as oil and gas, the situation is slightly different. There, too, markets seek a supply-demand balance based on the most cost-efficient mix, resulting in significant price fluctuations. Yet, the requirements there are just a bit less strict.

Recently, in the UK, the national grid operator NESO (essentially the UK’s equivalent of TenneT) issued a call to households to use more electricity this coming summer. Not only to take advantage of low electricity prices and balance the grid, but also to save producers from having to pay substantial curtailment fees. Higher consumption would then lead to lower costs. This stands in contrast to the call from Brussels and the International Energy Agency to consumers of gas, oil, and petroleum products. There, we are seeing shortages as a result of the war in Iran, and lower consumption would help balance the market.

At the same time, policymakers sometimes tend to go too far in this regard. Just as during the energy crisis of 2021–22, there are renewed calls to decouple the electricity and gas markets. In fact, in the UK, they are actually going to try it—against all advice. After all, gas prices are high as a result of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran. And when the wind blows less and the sun shines less or not at all, it is mainly the gas-fired power plants that keep our electricity grid in balance. And those cost money. Not only because the price of gas is higher now, but because they have to make their business case work in fewer and fewer hours. If they can’t do that, there would no longer be an incentive to keep the plants available at all in case they are needed.

And that is where policymakers’ reasoning goes wrong. The idea behind decoupling the electricity and gas markets is that the price of electricity can sometimes be too high when gas is needed in the mix. After all, all electricity prices are then calculated based on the cost of the highest bidder—which is usually gas. This would lead to excessively high prices for consumers.

It remains a strange principle that we apparently have no problem with negative prices during times of oversupply, yet struggle with higher prices during times of shortage. Regardless of the scenario, there are winners and losers in the market. When prices are negative, investors in solar and wind energy earn nothing, and policymakers even feel compelled to use subsidies to coax out even more investment. When prices are high, parties that are making a profit at that moment are almost treated like criminals, whereas you should actually be grateful that they are solving “the problem of shortages” at a higher price.

Selective intervention—or the lack thereof—in markets not only leads to uncertainty in financial markets and misaligned incentives regarding demand management and investments in energy sources. Above all, it leads to a less efficient market. Decoupling gas and electricity will result in the creation of two separate markets. Each with its own supply-and-demand balance, its own backup systems to ensure security of supply, and its own rules and oversight. And this at a time when liquidity in those markets will be lower.

The fact that consumers sometimes pay more for gas as a backup or for curtailing renewable energy sources during periods of oversupply is a result of the current electricity mix. Do you want to eliminate gas from the mix entirely? Then you’ll need to install even more renewable electricity sources. In many cases, this leads to more frequent negative prices, making the business case unsustainable without corresponding growth in electricity demand. On the other hand, if you still want a fixed price, sign a fixed-rate contract as a household, or, as a business, enter into a Power Purchase Agreement (fixed price) or a Contract for Difference(variable price within a range).

Fragmenting markets and thereby making them even more complex is a recipe for uncertainty, resulting in even greater volatility with much higher and much lower prices. And this is despite the fact that energy bills are primarily determined by energy taxes, grid fees, transmission costs, and VAT. So if the government actually wants to do something about high prices, it already has the most important tools at its disposal.

 

Hans van Cleef is Head of Energy Research at EqoLibrium (this column was written in a personal capacity and previously published on Studio Energie Opinie)

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